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Between 2014 and 2017, as part of the European migration crisis, the number of refugees 
entering Italy rose dramatically. Most of these refugees were received by Sicily. This paper 
analyzes the impact of the large influx of migrants on the Sicilian labor market using 2010-18 
data from the Italian Labor Force Survey. I use the difference-in-difference method to measure 
the effects of the migration crisis on employment and workforce participation rates, salaries, and 
duration of non-employment in Sicily among 20-64-year-old Italians, looking specifically at low-
skilled men and women. I find that between 2014 and 2018 low-skilled men experienced 
declines in employment and workforce participation, as well as large increases in duration of 
non-employment. Among low-skilled women, the effects on employment were small and mostly 
insignificant, while the effects on duration of non-employment were smaller than those among 
low-skilled men. In terms of salaries, the effects of the crisis were modest and largely 
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1 Introduction  
 
 The question of how immigration affects the labor market has long been debated by labor 
economists (Borjas, 2003; Borjas, 2017; Card, 1990; Ottaviano and Peri, 2008). Measuring the 
effects of immigration can be quite difficult. A supply shock, in the form of a refugee crisis for 
example, allows economists to measure these effects more easily. While the examining the 
effects of a refugee crisis on the labor market is more straightforward than examining the effects 
of migration inflows, there is no clear-cut conclusion on how such crises affects workers. Card 
(1990) finds that the Mariel Boatlift had no significant effect on workers in Miami. Similarly, 
Friedberg (2001) finds that the influx of Soviet Jews into Israel had no effect on the local labor 
market. On the other hand, Borjas and Monras (2017) find that refugee influxes negatively affect 
native workers. In this paper, I examine the effects of a refugee influx on the labor market by 
looking at the 2014-17 migration crisis in Italy. 
Between the years 2014 and 2017, Italy experienced a large influx of migrants as part of 
what has come to be known as the European migrant crisis. Conflicts in different areas led to a 
surge in the number of refugees coming to Europe; at the height of the crisis in 2015, when over 
a million refugees arrived by sea, more than half of them came from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq 
(Europe Refugees & Migrants Emergency Response, 2015; Key Data for Europe, 2017). In 2015 
and 2016 Europe received 2.5 million first-time asylum applications. Germany received 45 
percent of these applications followed by Italy and Hungary, which each received 8 percent (Pew 
Research Center, 2017). However, although over a million refugees entered Germany between 




Between 2014 and 2017 more than 600,000 migrants arrived in Italy by sea, almost triple 
the number of migrants that had arrived in the previous ten years (figure 1). The vast majority of 
these migrants left for Italy from Libya, originally coming from other countries in Africa, as well 
as the Middle East and Asia (Update #4 Italy – Sea Arrivals, Dec 2015; Italy Country Update, 
Dec 2016; Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard, Dec 2017). In 2014 Syrians made up 25 percent of the 
migrants entering Italy, however the share of Syrian arrivals later dropped, with Syrians 
primarily using the Eastern Mediterranean route (Update #4 Italy – Sea Arrivals, Dec 2015). 
Overall, Africans, in particular Nigerians and Eritreans, made up the largest share of migrants 
coming to Italy (Update #4 Italy – Sea Arrivals, Dec 2015; Italy Country Update, Dec 2016; Italy 
Sea Arrivals Dashboard, Dec 2017). Political instability and conflict, as well as high 
unemployment rates and low wage rates have pushed many sub-Saharan Africans to migrate 
(Pew Research Center, 2018). While most migrants arriving in Italy by sea during the crisis were 
men, the second largest group in 2016 and 2017 was unaccompanied children (Update #4 Italy – 
Sea Arrivals, Dec 2015; Italy Country Update, Dec 2016; Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard, Dec 
2017). Among the Italian regions, Sicily received the largest number of sea arrivals, with smaller 
numbers going to Campania, Calabria, Apulia, and Sardinia (Update #4 Italy – Sea Arrivals, Dec 
2015; Italy Country Update, Dec 2016). Although a relocation scheme for asylum seekers was 
put in place by the European Union to help Italy manage the flow of migrants, the process has 
been slow, and as of April 29, 2018 (the last date for which the data are available), only 32 
percent of the 39,600 target were relocated (Italy Weekly Snapshot, 29 April 2018). 
In this paper, I analyze the effects of the 2014-2017 migrant crisis on the labor market in 
Sicily. Using 2010-18 individual microdata from the Italian National Institute of Statistics’ Labor 
Force Survey, I measure the effects of the migrant crisis on employment and workforce 
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participation rates, salaries, and duration of non-employment in Sicily among 20-64-year-olds. I 
use the difference-in-difference method to assess how Italian workers in Sicily, specifically low-
skilled workers, fared compared to those in the central and southern regions of Sicily (excluding 
other regions that received migrants).  
In terms of employment, low-skilled Italian men seem to have been more negatively 
impacted by the migrant crisis than low-skilled Italian women. The effects on employment for 
low-skilled women were small and largely insignificant. The effect of the crisis on employment 
among low-skilled men increased between 2014 and 2018, with low-skilled men 3.7 percent less 
likely to be employed in 2018. Moreover, low-skilled Italian men experienced significant 
increases in their duration of non-employment between 2014 and 2018. Low-skilled Italian 
women also saw their duration of non-employment increase as a result of the crisis, but these 
effects declined between 2015 and 2018. I find that the migration crisis had a small negative 
effect on the salaries of low-skilled workers. The effects of the crisis on salaries were mostly 
insignificant. Low-skilled Italian women experienced the largest effects, with their salaries 
decreasing by 5.1 percent in 2017.     
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is a literature review. In the third 
section, I describe the data source and sample. In section 4, I explain the methodology. I present 
the results in section 5, and section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
It is difficult to measure the effects of immigration on the labor market. Estimates of 
immigration effects tend to be biased since immigration inflows often depend on local economic 
conditions. When considering immigration inflows, economists often use instrumental variables 
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to try and solve this endogeneity problem. Altonji and Card (1991) use the share of immigrants 
in different cities in the U.S. 1970 to predict the change in the share of immigrants in those cities. 
When measuring the effects of immigration on labor markets in Western Europe in the 1990s, 
Angrist and Kugler (2003) use the distance between Yugoslavia and cities in Western Europe as 
an instrument for the fraction of immigrants in Western Europe. D’amuri et al. (2010) estimate 
the impacts of immigration on the West German labor market using the influx of East Germans 
after 1991 as an instrument for all new immigration into West Germany. Another way to solve 
the endogeneity problem is by measuring the effects of a large influx of migrants on the labor 
market. Economists consider such influxes to be exogenous supply shocks and use them as 
natural experiments. Card (1990) analyzes the effects of the 1980 Mariel Boatlift on the labor 
market in Miami. Friedberg (2001) uses the mass migration of Soviet Jews to Israel to measure 
the effects of immigration on the Israeli labor market. Card (1990) and Friedberg (2001) examine 
the effects of a refugee influx on the labor market, as oppose to the effects of steady immigration 
inflows on the labor market. While it is possible to draw conclusions about the structure of the 
labor market from both types of studies, the effects of a refugee influx do not determine the 
effects of immigration inflows.  
Both Card (1990) and Friedberg (2001) find that the refugee crises they analyzed did not 
negatively affect workers. Card (1990) finds that even low-skilled black and non-Cuban workers, 
who should be vulnerable to large influxes of low-skilled migrants, were not negatively impact 
by the Boatlift. Friedberg (2001) examines how native workers in occupations that received a 
large influx of Russians were affected; after controlling for endogeneity, she finds that the influx 
did not lower wages or affect employment opportunities in these occupations. Borjas and Monras 
(2017), however, find that both the Mariel Boatlift and the influx of Soviet Jews into Israel 
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negatively affected workers. They show that in fact the Boatlift led to a decline in the wages of 
high school dropouts, specifically male high school dropouts, while more educated workers saw 
their wages increase. In the case of the influx of Russian Jews into Israel, by considering not 
only their occupation choice but also their level of education, Borjas and Monras (2017) find that 
high-skilled workers in Israel were negatively impacted by the influx, while low-skilled Israeli 
workers benefited. They conclude that “competing natives” are hurt by refugee influxes, while 
“complementary workers” gain.  
Fakih and Ibrahim (2016), Bağir (2018), and Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2018) consider more 
recent refugee crises. Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2018) look at the European migration crisis, 
specifically at Germany and the effect of an influx of 2.5 refugees between 2014 and 2015 on the 
employment of natives. Using the difference-in-difference method, they find that native workers 
did not experience an increase in unemployment. This was the case even among young native 
workers, with whom the mostly young refugees would have been competing (Gehrsitz& 
Ungerer, 2018). Fakih and Ibrahim (2016) and Bağir (2018) analyze the effects of the Syrian 
refugee crisis on Jordan and Turkey, respectively. Fakih and Ibrahim (2016) find that the influx 
of over 600,000 Syrian refugees into Jordan has had no impact on the Jordanian labor market. 
They suggest that restrictions on Syrian refugees could explain their results. Bağir (2018) finds 
that the Turkish workers were negatively affected by the crisis, at least in the border regions. In 
these regions unemployment rates increased and wages decreased, especially among less-
educated workers. In the inner regions, on the other hand, there was a small decline in the wages 
of less-educated men, and no effect on employment.    
Aside from the endogeneity of immigration flows, economists face many other 
challenges when attempting to produce reliable estimates for the effects of immigration. The 
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results they arrive at depend not only on their method of analysis, but also whether they analyze 
national or regional labor markets, and how specific the groups they look at are (Longhi et al., 
2006). Zorlu and Hartog (2005) measure the effects of immigrant inflows on wages in the 
Netherlands, the UK and Norway, and find that the wages of earlier immigrants are more 
affected than those of natives. Similarly, D’amuri et al. (2010) they find that immigration into 
West Germany had negative effects on the wages and employment of earlier immigrants, but no 
negative impact on those of natives. Angrist and Kugler (2003), on the other hand, find that 
immigration flows in the 1980s and 1990s had a negative impact on native employment in 
Western Europe. According to Borjas (1995), in the case of wages, “a cross-section or time-
series comparison of local labor markets may be masking the "macro" effect of immigration.” 
Local labor markets are not closed, and a continuing flow of labor, capital and goods will affect 
how wages respond to immigration (Borjas, 1995). 
Even when studying the same phenomenon, economists produce contradicting results. 
Card (1990) finds that even among minorities and low-skilled workers in Miami wages were not 
affected by the influx of Cubans in 1980. However, Borjas (2017) finds that the Mariel Boatlift 
led a decline in the wages of high school dropouts in Miami. Peri and Yasenov (2019), criticizing 
both the choice of data source by Borjas (2017), as well as the fact that the negative impact he 
finds shows up two years after the Boatlift, confirm Card’s results. Peri and Yasenov (2019) use 
the May CPS as their main data source, while Borjas (2017) uses the March CPS. Moreover, Peri 
and Yasenov (2019) look at non-Cuban high school dropouts, between the ages of 19 and 65, and 
Borjas (2017) looks at male non-Hispanic high school dropouts between the ages of 25 and 29. 
Another example is the study of the effects of the inflow of less educated immigrants into the 
U.S. While Borjas (2003) finds large negative effects on native wages in the short run, Ottaviano 
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and Peri (2008) find that negative impact on native wages is actually quite small. They arrive at 
these results by accounting for short-run capital adjustment.  
The results in a study on the effects of immigration on the labor market also depend on the 
type of the labor market being analyzed. The effects of immigration will be more severe in less 
flexible labor markets. Employment protections, high entry barriers and reduced wage flexibility 
in many European countries increase the negative impact of immigration on native employment 
(Angrist & Kugler, 2003). D’amuri et al (2010) explain that Germany’s labor market institutions, 
such as generous unemployment benefits, prevented it from efficiently absorbing the 1990s 
migration supply shock. In general, the effects of immigration seem to be less severe in U.S. than 
in the Europe because of its more flexible labor market (Longhi et al, 2006).   
3 Data 
The data used for this paper are from the Italian Labor Force Survey for the years 2010-
2018. The survey is conducted quarterly by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. The survey 
is conducted in order to obtain information on the employment situation, the job search, and the 
attitudes towards the labor market of Italy’s working age population. All the members of each 
selected household are interviewed. The survey is conducted using a quarterly rotation scheme, 
where household are interviewed for two consecutive quarters, excluded for two quarters, and 
then interviewed again for another two quarters. My sample consists of Italians between the ages 
of 20 and 64, excluding those living in the regions of Campania, Calabria, Apulia, and Sardinia, 
as these regions also received refugees during the crisis. Because of a spike in sea arrivals in 
2011, which is in the pre-crisis period in terms of the timeline, I also exclude observations from 
that year (figure 1). So, the baseline period consists of 2010, 2012, and 2013. 
10 
 
Table 1 shows the unemployment and workforce participation rates, the mean net 
monthly salary, and the duration of non-employment of Italians in Sicily in 2013. The 
unemployment rate among low-skilled is higher, while the workforce participation rate is lower 
compared to Sicily as a whole. The average duration of non-employment is also higher among 
the low-skilled. On average, low-skilled Italian women have lower salaries than low-skilled 
Italian men. The unemployment rate of low-skilled women is almost 4 percentage points higher 
than that of low-skilled men. The differences in the workforce participation rate and the duration 
of non-employment between low-skilled Italian men and women are quite staggering. Among 
low-skilled men, the workforce participation rate is 67.47 percent and the average duration of 
non-employment is 4.5 years. On the other hand, only 31.57 percent of low-skilled women are in 
the workforce, and their average duration of non-employment is about 12 years. 87.6 percent of 
20-64-year-old Italians in Sicily have a high school degree or less, and 50.71 percent have not 
earned a high school degree. About 58 percent of low-skilled Italians do not have a high school 
degree. The numbers are about the same for low-skilled men and women.    
4 Methodology 
 Using the difference-in-difference method, I analyze how employment and workforce 
participation rates, duration of non-employment, and monthly salary change in the region of 
Sicily as a result of the influx of migrants. I look at how these outcomes are affected in each 
crisis year and the year immediately following the crisis, using central and the rest of southern 
Italy as a control group. The difference-in-difference method requires that the treatment and 
control groups have similar pre-treatment trends in outcomes. Outcome levels, on the other hand, 
can vary between the groups. I test that Sicily (the treated region) and central and southern Italy 
follow similar trends in employment conditions, duration of non-employment, and monthly 
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salary. The results from the tests are presented in table 2. The tests fail to reject the hypothesis of 
parallel trends for salaries, duration of non-employment, and unemployment rates. There appears 
to be evidence of parallel trend failure for the out-of-labor-force rate, however, in general, 
outcomes seem to follow similar trends before the crisis.     
 To estimate the effect of the migration crisis on salary, I run linear regressions on the log 
of net monthly salary. The baseline regression is as follows: 
ln(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑢   (1) 
where i refers to the years 2014 to 2018. I add controls for age, education, sex, and family type. I 
estimate the regressions separately among low-skilled Italian men and low-skilled Italian 
women. I define low-skilled workers as individuals with a high school education or less. The 
standard errors are clustered by region. I use cluster-robust standard errors in the following 
regressions as well. 
 Next, I estimate the effects of the migration crisis on employment and workforce 
participation rates using a multinomial logit. I report the marginal effects from these regressions. 
The variable for employment condition is a categorical variable that indicates whether an 
individual is employed, unemployed or out of the workforce. The structure of the variable makes 
the multinomial logit a more suitable model than a simple linear regression. The baseline 
regression is as follows: 
𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀   (2) 
where emp is a categorical variable referring to employment and workforce participation. Again, 
I add controls for age, education, sex, and family type, and estimate the model separately among 
low-skilled Italian men and women.    
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 Lastly, I estimate the effects of the influx of refugees on duration of non-employment 
among the unemployed using a linear regression. The baseline regression is as follows:   
𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜖   (3) 
where durnonemp refers to the duration of non-employment in months. I add the same controls 
as before and estimate the model among the same three groups.  
5 Results 
 The results from the linear regressions on monthly salary are presented in tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3 shows the effects of the migration crisis on the log of net monthly wages in Sicily for the 
entire sample. The migration crisis seems to have had a small negative effect on salaries in 
Sicily. However, the effects are only significant in 2015 and 2017. After adding controls for age, 
education, family type, citizenship and gender, the effects on salaries decrease, but remain 
significant in 2017. Table 4 shows the effects of the crisis on the monthly salaries of low-skilled 
Italian workers in Sicily. As can be seen in column (1), the effects of the crisis on the salaries of 
low-skilled workers are modest and significant only in 2015 and 2017. Low-skilled Italian men 
did not experience significant declines in their salaries. Low-skilled Italian women, on the other 
hand, saw their salaries decrease by 5.1 percent in 2017. They also experienced a smaller, but 
statistically significant decline in their salaries in 2015.  
 Overall, the effect of the crisis on the salaries of low-skilled Italian workers is quite 
small. I would like to note that the effects are on net monthly salaries, not wages. The Labor 
Force Survey conducted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics does not include 
information on before-tax salaries. Although these results hint to wages having gone down 
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slightly, running these regressions on wages instead of on net monthly salary will produce more 
accurate results. 
 In tables 5 and 6, I present the marginal effects from the regressions on employment and 
workforce participation. Table 5 shows the effects of the crisis on employment and workforce 
participation in Sicily for the entire sample. Italians in Sicily are less likely to be employed and 
more likely to be out of the workforce as a result of the migration crisis. The effects of the crisis 
are again quite small, and significant only in some years. The impact of the crisis increases 
between 2014 and 2018. As can be seen in column (2), Italians were 0.8 percent less likely to be 
employed in 2015, and 2.2 percent less likely to be employed in 2018. While the effects on 
unemployment are significant between 2016 and 2018, the effects on workforce participation are 
not significant at all. The effects on low-skilled Italians are slightly larger. Table 6 shows that 
among low-skilled Italians the effects on employment increase over the period of the crisis and 
immediately following it. The effects on workforce participation are significant between 2016 
and 2018, with low-skilled Italians in Sicily 1.6 percent more likely to be out of the workforce in 
2018. Low-skilled Italian men seem to have been more affected by the crisis in terms of 
employment than low-skilled Italian women. While in 2014 low-skilled men were 1.4 percent 
less likely to be employed, in 2018 they were 3.7 percent less likely to be employed. The decline 
in the likelihood of low-skilled men being employed is mostly covered by an increase in the 
likelihood of being out of the workforce. The effects of the crisis on employment among low-
skilled Italian women are much smaller and mostly insignificant.  
The results from the regressions on duration of non-employment are presented in tables 7 
and 8. Table 7 shows the effects of the migration crisis on the duration of non-employment in 
Sicily for the entire sample. The effects of the crisis on duration of non-employment decrease 
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after the addition of controls, but remain positive and significant, except in 2014. As can be seen 
in column (1) of table 8, the effects on low-skilled Italians are slightly higher. Low-skilled Italian 
men and women seem to have been impacted by the crisis in different years in terms of duration 
of non-employment. For low-skilled Italian men, the effects of the crisis increase between 2014 
and 2018. The migration crisis increased their duration of non-employment by 6.1 months in 
2014, and by 12.8 months in 2018. For low-skilled Italian women, the effects of the crisis 
decrease between 2015 and 2018. Moreover, the impact of the crisis is statistically insignificant 
in 2014 and 2018 among low-skilled women.    
 Based on the results from both the regressions on professional condition and the 
regressions of duration of non-employment, it seems that low-skilled Italian men suffered more 
in terms of employment than low-skilled Italian women as a result of the crisis. The migrants 
that arrived in Sicily were mostly men and are probably closer substitutes to low-skilled men 
than low-skilled women. With more competition, low-skilled Italian men have a harder time 
finding a job, resulting in a lower employment rate and longer periods of non-employment. 
Moreover, the difficulty in finding work could increase their frustration with the labor market, 
causing many of them to leave the workforce instead of looking for a job.       
6 Conclusion 
 The migrant crisis of 2014-2017 does seem to have negatively impacted the Italian 
workers in Sicily, specifically low-skilled men. I find that the migration crisis had a small 
negative effect on the net monthly salaries of low-skilled workers, with the salaries of low-
skilled Italian women falling by 5.1 percent in 2017. However, the crisis did not significantly 
affect the salaries of low-skilled men. Employment among low-skilled Italians also declined as a 
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result of the migrant crisis. The effect of the crisis on the likelihood of low-skilled Italian men 
being employed increased between 2014 and 2018. In 2018, low-skilled men were 3.7 percent 
less likely to be employed. Low-skilled Italian women, on the other hand, experienced smaller, 
and mostly insignificant declines in employment. In the case of low-skilled Italian men, the 
decline in the likelihood of being employed is mainly reflected by an increase in the likelihood of 
leaving the workforce. This could be due to rising frustration from a more competitive labor 
market. The duration of non-employment among low-skilled Italian men and women increased 
significantly as a result of the crisis. However, the increase was especially dramatic among low-
skilled men who saw their duration of non-employment increase by over a year in 2018. 
I would like to specify few caveats. First, I do not apply the difference-in-difference 
model to a policy change. There were migrants coming into Sicily before the migration crisis, 
and observations from 2011 even had to be excluded because of a small spike in migration 
(figure 1). Second, the fact that the pre-crisis trends in workforce participation in Sicily and in 
central and southern Italy were different means that the effects of the crisis on workforce 
participation may not be accurate. Third, estimating the effect of the migrant crisis by comparing 
Sicily to central and southern Italy might not be the most effective way to analyze the effects of 
the crisis on the Sicilian labor market. Like the rest of the Italian regions, Sicily is separated into 
several provinces and counties. The number of migrants is different from province to province, 
with certain provinces receiving a much larger number of migrants than others. While the Italian 
Labor Force Survey does ask participants what province they live in, the information is not 
available in the datasets from 2008-2013. As a result, I could not perform a comparison between 
provinces. Fourth, the fact that the closest variable to wages in the data is net monthly salary is 
not ideal. Although there is a general decline in salaries, quantifying the decline does not tell us 
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much about the labor market because the salaries are not market salaries, but take-home salaries. 
Lastly, in this paper, I analyze the short-term effects of the migrant crisis on the Sicilian labor 
market. The effects of the crisis on employment opportunities and wages are subject to change as 
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Table 1 - Characteristics of 20-64-Year-Old Italians in Sicily in 2013 
 
 Sicily Low-skilled Low-skilled men  Low-skilled women 
Unemployment rate 
 
20.18% 22.44% 21.17% 24.99% 
Workforce participation rate 
 
52.24% 48.94% 67.47% 31.57% 
Mean net monthly salary 
 
1205.95 1110.43 1190.11 961.51 
Mean duration of non-employment 
in months 
83.18 85.77 54.37 120.17 
Percent with a high school 
education or less 
87.38%    
Percent with less than a high school 
education 
50.26% 57.53% 57.55% 57.50% 
     
20 
 
Table 2 – F-statistics for Pre-Crisis Trend Test 
Variable ln(salary) duration of non-
employment 
   unemployed not in the        
workforce 
Sicily*2010 0.002 0.012 0.002 -0.069*** 
 (0.007) (1.798) (0.038) (0.014) 
Sicily*2013 -0.003 -0.257 0.025 0.030* 
 (0.005) (1.922) (0.018) (0.017) 
_cons 6.391*** 6.205 0.218 1.619*** 
 (0.029) (4.919) (0.191) (0.089) 
F test: Sicily*2010 = 0, Sicily*2013 = 0 0.27 0.01 2.03 30.99 
p-value 0.7680 0.9911 0.3621 0.0000 
R2 0.29 0.22   
N          127,869              83,596              314,331              314,331 
       ¹ Cluster robust errors in parentheses. 
          ² All models include region, year and quarter fixed effects, as well as controls for age, family type, education and sex. 
















Table 2 – Ordinary Least Squares of Log Net Monthly Salary 
Variable               (1)               (2) 
Sicily*2014 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
Sicily*2015 -0.009** -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Sicily*2016 0.001 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
Sicily*2017 -0.021** -0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Sicily*2018 -0.011 -0.011* 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Age   
  25-29  0.121*** 
  (0.007) 
  30-34  0.244*** 
  (0.007) 
  35-39  0.334*** 
  (0.008) 
  40-44  0.401*** 
  (0.011) 
  45-49  0.454*** 
  (0.010) 
  50-54  0.499*** 
  (0.012) 
  55-59  0.531*** 
  (0.014) 
  60-64  0.549*** 
  (0.020) 
Family type   
  Couple with children  0.022*** 
  (0.003) 
  Couple without children  0.013*** 
  (0.002) 
  Male single parent  -0.022** 
  (0.006) 
  Female single parent  -0.034*** 
  (0.006) 
Education   
  Elementary school  0.090 
  (0.048) 
  Middle school  0.281*** 
  (0.039) 
  High school 2-3 years  0.376*** 
  (0.042) 
  High school 4-5 years  0.485*** 
  (0.044) 
  Laurea  0.721*** 
  (0.051) 
Female  -0.298*** 
  (0.005) 
_cons 7.063*** 6.377*** 
 (0.004) (0.048) 
R2 0.01 0.29 
N 269,306            265,647 
       ¹ Cluster robust errors in parentheses.  
        ² All models include region, year and quarter fixed effects. 
³ A 2-3 years diploma does not allow for the possibility of applying to university. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 




Table 4 – Ordinary Least Squares of Log Net Monthly Salary 
               (1)              (2)              (3) 




Sicily*2014 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Sicily*2015 -0.013* -0.010 -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Sicily*2016 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Sicily*2017 -0.018* 0.001 -0.051*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) 
Sicily*2018 -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) 
Age    
  25-29 0.140*** 0.151*** 0.120*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) 
  30-34 0.252*** 0.271*** 0.220*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
  35-39 0.319*** 0.348*** 0.268*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) 
  40-44 0.360*** 0.388*** 0.308*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.021) 
  45-49 0.394*** 0.422*** 0.341*** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.021) 
  50-54 0.424*** 0.437*** 0.389*** 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.027) 
  55-59 0.446*** 0.434*** 0.441*** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.037) 
  60-64 0.439*** 0.416*** 0.446*** 
 (0.031) (0.020) (0.057) 
Family type    
  Couple with children 0.019*** 0.068*** -0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) 
  Couple without children 0.007 0.041*** -0.040*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
  Male single parent -0.032** 0.001 -0.055 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.040) 
  Female single parent -0.051*** -0.099*** -0.060*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Female -0.292***   
 (0.008)   
_cons 6.802*** 6.748*** 6.599*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.022) 
R2 0.19 0.15 0.07 
N            209,324          122,998           86,326 
       ¹ Cluster robust errors in parentheses.  
        ² All models include region, year and quarter fixed effects. 
³ A 2-3 years diploma does not allow for the possibility of applying to university. 





Table 5 – Margins from Multinomial Logit of Employment and Workforce Participation 
Variable  (1)  (2) 
Sicily*2014 Employed -0.011 -0.007 
  (0.008) (0.006) 
 Unemployed -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
 Not in the workforce  0.013 0.009 
  (0.009) (0.006) 
Sicily*2015 Employed -0.008 -0.008* 
  (0.006) (0.005) 
 Unemployed 0.003 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
 Not in the workforce  0.006 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.006) 
Sicily*2016 Employed -0.014** -0.014*** 
  (0.006) (0.004) 
 Unemployed 0.006*** 0.007** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
 Not in the workforce  0.008 0.008 
  (0.008) (0.005) 
Sicily*2017 Employed -0.016** -0.014*** 
  (0.007) (0.005) 
 Unemployed 0.005* 0.005** 
  (0.003) (0.002) 
 Not in the workforce  0.012 0.009 
  (0.008) (0.006) 
Sicily*2018 Employed -0.022*** -0.021*** 
  (0.008) (0.006) 
 Unemployed 0.010*** 0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
 Not in the workforce  0.012 0.010 
  (0.009) (0.006) 
Age    
  25-29 Employed  0.191*** 
   (0.019) 
 Unemployed  0.010 
   (0.006) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.200*** 
   (0.024) 
  30-34 Employed  0.353*** 
   (0.028) 
 Unemployed  -0.023*** 
   (0.006) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.330*** 
   (0.034) 
  35-39 Employed  0.418*** 
   (0.023) 
 Unemployed  -0.058*** 
   (0.008) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.359*** 
   (0.029) 
  40-44 Employed  0.445*** 
   (0.016) 
 Unemployed  -0.076*** 
   (0.009) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.369*** 
   (0.025) 
  45-49 Employed  0.456*** 
   (0.012) 
 Unemployed  -0.090*** 
   (0.010) 
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 Not in the workforce   -0.366*** 
   (0.021) 
  50-54 Employed  0.446*** 
   (0.011) 
 Unemployed  -0.103*** 
   (0.009) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.343*** 
   (0.018) 
  55-59 Employed  0.377*** 
   (0.008) 
 Unemployed  -0.118*** 
   (0.007) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.259*** 
   (0.007) 
  60-64 Employed  0.116*** 
   (0.025) 
 Unemployed  -0.137*** 
   (0.006) 
 Not in the workforce   0.021 
   (0.020) 
Type of family    
  Couple with children Employed  -0.017*** 
   (0.007) 
 Unemployed  -0.020*** 
   (0.003) 
 Not in the workforce   0.037*** 
   (0.008) 
  Couple without children Employed  -0.022*** 
   (0.007) 
 Unemployed  -0.023*** 
   (0.004) 
 Not in the workforce   0.045*** 
   (0.009) 
  Male single parent Employed  -0.067*** 
   (0.013) 
 Unemployed  0.004 
   (0.003) 
 Not in the workforce   0.063*** 
   (0.011) 
  Female single parent Employed  -0.039*** 
   (0.004) 
 Unemployed  0.015*** 
   (0.002) 
 Not in the workforce   0.024*** 
   (0.003) 
Education    
  Elementary school Employed  0.117*** 
   (0.015) 
 Unemployed  0.040*** 
   (0.013) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.157*** 
   (0.025) 
  Middle school Employed  0.250*** 
   (0.010) 
 Unemployed  0.027** 
   (0.012) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.277*** 
   (0.020) 
  High school 2-3 years Employed  0.329*** 
   (0.010) 
 Unemployed  0.028** 
   (0.012) 
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 Not in the workforce   -0.356*** 
   (0.017) 
  High school 4-5 years Employed  0.408*** 
   (0.008) 
 Unemployed  -0.001 
   (0.013) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.407*** 
   (0.010) 
  Laurea Employed  0.511*** 
   (0.019) 
 Unemployed  -0.007 
   (0.014) 
 Not in the workforce   -0.504*** 
   (0.013) 
Female Employed  -0.219*** 
   (0.016) 
 Unemployed  -0.013*** 
   (0.004) 
 Not in the workforce   0.232*** 
   (0.020) 
N        645,897           635,567 
       ¹ Cluster robust errors in parentheses.  
        ² All models include region, year and quarter fixed effects. 
³ A 2-3 years diploma does not allow for the possibility of applying to university. 














Table 6 – Margins from Multinomial Logit of Employment and Workforce Participation 
       (1)            (2)            (3) 
Variable     Low-skilled 
Italians  
Low-skilled Italian 
men      
Low-skilled Italian 
women  
Sicily*2014 Employed -0.009 -0.005 -0.011** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
 Unemployed -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
 Not in the workforce  0.011 0.007 0.013** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Sicily*2015 Employed -0.010** -0.014*** -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
 Unemployed 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
 Not in the workforce  0.009 0.014** 0.003 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Sicily*2016 Employed -0.019*** -0.028*** -0.005 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
 Unemployed 0.005* 0.005 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
 Not in the workforce  0.014** 0.023*** 0.002 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Sicily*2017 Employed -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
 Unemployed 0.004 0.006 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
 Not in the workforce  0.015** 0.025*** 0.003 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
Sicily*2018 Employed -0.027*** -0.037*** -0.014 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) 
 Unemployed 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 Not in the workforce  0.016** 0.025*** 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
Age     
  25-29 Employed 0.236*** 0.270*** 0.212*** 
  (0.023) (0.020) (0.025) 
 Unemployed -0.003 -0.019*** 0.013 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
 Not in the workforce -0.232*** -0.251*** -0.225*** 
  (0.029) (0.023) (0.033) 
  30-34 Employed 0.347*** 0.408*** 0.288*** 
  (0.031) (0.027) (0.034) 
 Unemployed -0.032*** -0.045*** -0.023** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) 
 Not in the workforce -0.315*** -0.363*** -0.265*** 
  (0.036) (0.027) (0.044) 
  35-39 Employed 0.383*** 0.467*** 0.297*** 
  (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) 
 Unemployed -0.056*** -0.076*** -0.040*** 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) 
 Not in the workforce -0.326*** -0.391*** -0.257*** 
  (0.034) (0.028) (0.041) 
  40-44 Employed 0.392*** 0.481*** 0.299*** 
  (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) 
 Unemployed -0.069*** -0.088*** -0.053*** 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.014) 
 Not in the workforce -0.323*** -0.393*** -0.246*** 
  (0.029) (0.027) (0.035) 
  45-49 Employed 0.390*** 0.477*** 0.298*** 
  (0.016) (0.023) (0.015) 
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 Unemployed -0.080*** -0.093*** -0.072*** 
  (0.010) (0.005) (0.017) 
 Not in the workforce -0.310*** -0.385*** -0.226*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) 
  50-54 Employed 0.368*** 0.459*** 0.269*** 
  (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) 
 Unemployed -0.094*** -0.100*** -0.092*** 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) 
 Not in the workforce -0.274*** -0.359*** -0.177*** 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.033) 
  55-59 Employed 0.272*** 0.345*** 0.183*** 
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) 
 Unemployed -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.113*** 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.014) 
 Not in the workforce -0.162*** -0.234*** -0.069*** 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.022) 
  60-64 Employed 0.001 0.021 -0.036*** 
  (0.020) (0.028) (0.011) 
 Unemployed -0.134*** -0.142*** -0.130*** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) 
 Not in the workforce 0.132*** 0.121*** 0.166*** 
  (0.017) (0.029) (0.015) 
Family type     
  Couple with children Employed -0.011 0.074*** -0.105*** 
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.016) 
 Unemployed -0.023*** -0.015*** -0.035*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
 Not in the workforce 0.034*** -0.058*** 0.139*** 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) 
  Couple without children Employed -0.030*** 0.035*** -0.102*** 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) 
 Unemployed -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.033*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) 
 Not in the workforce 0.054*** -0.018 0.134*** 
  (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
  Male single parent Employed -0.076*** -0.023** -0.114*** 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.029) 
 Unemployed 0.002 0.006 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Not in the workforce 0.074*** 0.017** 0.117*** 
  (0.012) (0.008) (0.027) 
  Female single parent Employed -0.042*** -0.124*** -0.036*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) 
 Unemployed 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.007 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
 Not in the workforce 0.026*** 0.098*** 0.029*** 
  (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
Female Employed -0.244***   
  (0.019)   
 Unemployed -0.019***   
  (0.004)   
 Not in the workforce 0.262***   
  (0.023)   
N          531,993         264,788           267,205 
       ¹ Cluster robust errors in parentheses.  
        ² All models include region, year and quarter fixed effects.  
³ A 2-3 years diploma does not allow for the possibility of applying to university. 




Table 7 – Ordinary Least Squares of Duration of Non-Employment 
Variable              (1)                 (2) 
Sicily*2014 3.308** 0.861 
 (1.298) (1.113) 
Sicily*2015 6.976*** 6.134*** 
 (1.170) (0.760) 
Sicily*2016 9.355*** 7.843*** 
 (1.785) (1.517) 
Sicily*2017 9.699*** 7.788*** 
 (2.038) (1.190) 
Sicily*2018 10.662** 6.898** 
 (3.908) (2.820) 
Age   
  25-29  9.254*** 
  (1.264) 
  30-34  13.657*** 
  (1.944) 
  35-39  25.103*** 
  (3.064) 
  40-44  41.720*** 
  (2.061) 
  45-49  62.360*** 
  (1.752) 
  50-54  83.717*** 
  (1.868) 
  55-59  93.556*** 
  (3.383) 
  60-64  90.397*** 
  (3.267) 
Family type   
  Couple with children  9.567** 
  (3.284) 
  Couple without children  5.633* 
  (2.564) 
  Male single parent  5.043 
  (3.624) 
  Female single parent  0.319 
  (1.847) 
Education   
  Elementary school  -1.590 
  (3.825) 
  Middle school  -16.572*** 
  (2.553) 
  High school 2-3 years  -20.199*** 
  (4.425) 
  High school 4-5 years  -35.717*** 
  (3.323) 
  Laurea  -60.759*** 
  (4.026) 
Female  68.309*** 
  (4.113) 
_cons 98.456*** 2.354 
 (2.348) (5.622) 
R2 0.004 0.22 
N          169,356              166,343 
       ¹ Cluster robust errors in parentheses. 
        ² All models include region, year and quarter fixed effects. 
³ A 2-3 years diploma does not allow for the possibility of applying to university. 




Table 8 – Ordinary Least Squares of Duration of Non-Employment 
                 (1)               (2)              (3) 




Sicily*2014 2.211 6.085*** -0.044 
 (1.348) (1.073) (2.078) 
Sicily*2015 7.286*** 6.025*** 9.450*** 
 (0.908) (1.597) (1.348) 
Sicily*2016 7.248*** 6.959*** 8.500*** 
 (1.573) (1.621) (1.715) 
Sicily*2017 8.215*** 10.935*** 6.886*** 
 (1.482) (2.563) (1.173) 
Sicily*2018 7.945** 12.795*** 2.517 
 (3.353) (3.416) (3.655) 
Age    
  25-29 9.056*** 8.291*** 12.075*** 
 (0.953) (1.583) (1.392) 
  30-34 16.027*** 14.035*** 29.085*** 
 (1.411) (1.296) (2.042) 
  35-39 29.743*** 20.683*** 52.268*** 
 (2.147) (1.225) (3.534) 
  40-44 48.453*** 26.858*** 78.856*** 
 (1.682) (1.127) (3.418) 
  45-49 70.844*** 36.276*** 109.258*** 
 (1.898) (2.014) (4.321) 
  50-54 93.651*** 45.151*** 142.848*** 
 (3.216) (1.467) (4.922) 
  55-59 105.747*** 48.242*** 169.245*** 
 (3.483) (3.364) (6.880) 
  60-64 106.145*** 66.350*** 161.854*** 
 (4.036) (1.733) (7.910) 
Family Type    
  Couple with children 9.911** -19.642*** 48.526*** 
 (3.538) (2.499) (3.294) 
  Couple without children 7.469** -14.790*** 32.365*** 
 (3.155) (3.606) (3.557) 
  Male single parent 6.224 -6.852 11.403 
 (3.679) (3.921) (6.998) 
  Female single parent 0.080 6.682** 11.932*** 
 (2.167) (2.565) (3.166) 
Female 71.944***   
 (4.177)   
_cons -30.373*** 26.797*** -29.917*** 
 (7.221) (2.942) (8.439) 
R2 0.20 0.12 0.17 
N              151,762           67,006           84,756 
     ¹ Cluster robust errors in parentheses.  
      ² All models include region, year and quarter fixed effects.  
 ³ A 2-3 years diploma does not allow for the possibility of applying to university. 






















Data source: Italy’s Ministry of the Interior 
 
